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SOME REMARKS ON JUDICIAL SELF-RESTRAINT
HANs G. RupP*
In February, 1960 a new municipal and county elections law
was enacted in the Saarland, one of the member states of the Federal
Republic of Germany. It established a system of proportional distri-
bution of seats in the city, county and town councils among competing
candidate's lists, but reserved to "political parties" in section 25,
paragraph 2, the right to file candidate's lists. This, in effect, prevented
non-partisan local citizens' groups from presenting their own tickets
to the voters. A date for statewide municipal and county elections
was set by the government for May 15, 1960. On April 2, a prospective
candidate of one of the excluded local citizens groups in the town of
Merzig-who actually was a member of the CDU, a political party,
but who apparently had been refused a place on its ticket-filed a com-
plaint with the Federal Constitutional Court' on the ground that the
statute violated his constitutional right of equal opportunity to enter
an election as a candidate. He prayed that section 25, paragraph 2 of
the statute be declared unconstitutional and asked further that the
court by temporary injunction enjoin the authorities from holding the
election pending the decision on the validity of the statute. On May
10 the court denied the petition to grant the injunction. The elections
were held on May 15 as scheduled. On July 12 the court announced
its decision declaring section 25, paragraph 2 unconstitutional and
therefore, void ab initio.2 For the new election which must be held,
non-partisan citizens' group candidate's lists will be admitted (the
Saarland Legislative Assembly having amended the statute ac-
cordingly).
* Associate Justice, German Federal Constitutional Court, Karlsruhe; Professor of
Law, University of Tiibingen.
I The jurisdiction of the Federal Constitutional Court is very complex. For lack of
space it cannot be adequately outlined in this article. For a survey the reader is referred
to the author's article "Judicial Review in the Federal Republic of Germany," Am. J.
Comp. Law 29-47 (1959); see also Taylor Cole, "The West German Federal Constitu-
tional Court," 20 J. Politics 278 (195); same author: "The Bundesverfassungsgericht
1956-1958: An American appraisal," Jahrbuch des Offentlichen Rechts N.F. vol. 8, 29.
Abbreviations used in this article: GG = "Grundgesetz fuir die Bundesrepublik
Deutschland," of May 23, 1949, is the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany.
BVerfGG = "Gesetz iber das Bundesverfassungsgericht" of March 12, 1951, as amended,
is the statute governing the organization and procedure of the Federal Constitutional
Court. BVerfGR = "Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts," are the Reports of
the decisions of the Constitutional Court (up to September 1, 1960, 10 volumes pub-
lished).
2 Both decisions will be published in vol. 11 BVerfGE. A summary of the decision
of May 10 on the injunction has been published in Nr. 15/16 of the Juristenzeitung
(1960) on p. 488.
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In which stage of these proceedings did the court-if at all-
exercise "judicial self-restraint"? One thing is certain, the question
of proper use of judicial self-restraint would not have arisen had the
court had enough time to consider the case on its merits and to hand
down its decision before the day scheduled for the elections. This being
impossible for lack of time, would it not have been for the court to
grant the temporary injunction and order the elections put off until
a ruling on the merits had been handed down?
The Constitutional Court has been given power to declare state
and federal statutes void on constitutional grounds. It also has power
to grant a temporary injunction3 while a case is pending if this is
necessary to avoid grave disadvantages, to prevent imminent use of
force or for other specific urgent reasons. As evidence of this authority,
the very first action the court took immediately after it was organized
in September 1951 was to grant a temporary injunction delaying a
referendum provided for by federal statute in the states of Beden,
Wiirttemberg-Baden and Wiirttemberg-Hohenzollern on the question
whether they should be integrated into one state (now Baden-Wiirt-
temberg).1 The court had assumed its duties on September 8-the
Justices having taken their oath the day before-and the referendum
had been set for September 16. The constitutionality of the statute
governing the referendum proceedings had been heatedly disputed
for months by large sections of the population concerned. This fact
might well have influenced the result of the referendum had it been
held before the court had ruled on the constitutionality of the statute.
On the other hand, when in 1958 the federal government brought
suit against statutes enacted in the states of Hamburg and Bremen
providing for a statewide referendum on atomic rearmament 5, the
court enjoined the state authorities from holding the referendum pend-
ing a ruling on the validity of the statutes0 Although the referendum
was not intended to have legal consequences but only to inform the
state governments concerned on public opinion, the results could have
been used to put pressure on the federal government which had sole
responsibility for foreign affairs and defense. Therefore, a court
ruling declaring the statutes unconstitutional after the referendum had
been held would have made no sense; the adverse effects of an uncon-
stitutional referendum would not have been redressed.
In a similar way the court has granted a temporary injunction in
3 Sec. 32, para. 1 BVerfGG.
4 BVerfGE 1, 1; see also Von Mehren, "Constitutionalism in Germany," 1 Am. J.
Comp. Law 70 (1952); Leibholz, "The Federal Constitutional Court in Germany and
the South-Western Case," 46 Am. Pol. Sc. Rev. 723 (1952).
5 Rupp, op. cit. supra note 1 at 35.
6 BVerfGE 7, 367.
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extradition cases against enforcement of the extradition order of an
appellate court." Article 16 GG, stipulates that no German may be
extradited to a foreign country. It is obvious that a court ruling on
petitioner's status as a German citizen would be purely academic after
he has been transferred into the custody of a foreign country.
The rule applicable to all these cases is this: the court is the
supreme and only guardian against unconstitutional behavior of the
political departments of government. It has the power to strike down
unconstitutional laws and also to declare executive acts unconstitu-
tional. But the political departments are the principal actors on the
governmental stage and the court has only a referee-like function.
For these reasons it should not unnecessarily interfere with the conduct
of government. Such interference is most strongly felt when the court,
by temporary injunction, orders the executive department to cease
and desist from exercising some of its functions until their constitu-
tionality has been established, or when it counteracts legislative
endeavour by declaring a statute unenforceable pending a decision on
its validity. Thus, the court has repeatedly said that it would make
use of its power to issue a temporary injunction only with utmost
restraint ("nur mit grdsster Zuriickhaltung");s1 which is comparable
to Mr. Justice Stone's famous statement in his dissent in United States
v. Butler9 that the Supreme Court's own sense of self-restraint was
the only-but necessary-check upon the exercise of judicial power.
Coming back to the Saarland election case, we can now give an
answer to our question: the Federal Constitutional Court exercised
self-restraint in dismissing the application for a temporary injunction.
Such interference with the proper functions of the political departments
of government could be dispensed with as it was entirely possible to
repeat the election since the additional financial outlay for this under-
taking was not sufficient grounds for stopping the wheels of govern-
ment by court action.' °
7 BVerfGE 6, 443.
8 E.g., BVerfGE 3, 52, 55. The same line had been followed earlier during the Weimar
Republic by the "Staatsgerichtshof fUr das Deutche Reich." See Lammers-Simons, "Die
Rechtsprechung des Staatsgerichtshofs," vol. IV, 55,99, reporting a case in 1930: The
Reich Government had for some years given the states financial subsidies for their police
force. In 1930, the state of Thiiringen had formed a government in which a prominent
member of the Nazi party held the post of Minister of the Interior. After he had ap-
pointed fellow nazis to key positions in the police administration, the Reich Govern-
ment stopped payments. Thiiringen brought suit against the Reich and asked the "Staats-
gerichtshof" to order the Reich by temporary injunction to continue the payments pending
the decision on its obligation to pay. The court said, that it would use the device of
a temporary injunction "nur mit gr6sster Zuriickhaltung" and therefore denied the ap-
plication.
9 297 U.S. 1, 79 (1935).
10 This line of reasoning used by the court has been criticized, however, on the
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STATUTORY AND COURT IMPOSED RESTRAINTS
Although the Federal Constitutional Court has used the term
"mit griisster Zuriickkaltung" (with utmost restraint) thus far mainly
in connection with applications for a temporary injunction, it actually
has shown judicial self-restraint in many other instances.
Some features of judicial restraint do not depend entirely upon
the discretion of the court but are imposed on it by statute. They are
mentioned here because they are manifestations of the same principles.
As has already been said, there are two main areas of jurisdiction
allotted to the Constitutional Court; the power to declare federal
and state statutes unconstitutional on different procedural avenues,"
and the power to adjudicate disputes between the federal executive and
legislative departments and between the federal government and a
state government on their constitutional powers. 2
The Gesetz iiber das Bundesverjassungsgericht which lays down
the rules of procedure for the court, restrains it to a ruling in a mere
declaratory form. In case of a dispute between the political depart-
ments or between the federal government and a state, the court's
ruling will only state that the specific course of action or measure
(Massnahme) taken by the defendant does or does not violate article
Y of the GG.13 While the court may not order the defendant to
reverse its action, the defendant is under a legal obligation to comply
with the ruling which is binding on all agencies of the Federation and
the states. 4 The same rule applies in a case concerning the validity
of a statute. The court will either declare that the statute is void or
that it is consonant with the GG.' The difference in the legal effect
of a ruling granting a temporary injunction is obvious.
ground that an election, even if it has been held under a statute later declared uncon-
stitutional, nevertheless is a historical fact which will influence the outcome of a second
election held, thereafter, if only by keeping away disappointed and tired voters from the
ballot box. See note by Arndt in Juristenzeitung 1960, 488. In a similar ease concerning
the municipal elections law of the state of Niedersachsen, the court, however, on October
6, 1960 granted a temporary injunction putting off the election pending a ruling on the
constitutionality of the statute. This order, however, is not inconsistent with the course
taken by the court in the Saarland case, because it appeared from the record that the
Niedersachsen law was clearly unconstitutional. Since the court did not have the time
to say that in a written opinion before election day, it preferred granting a temporary
injunction and giving a ruling on the merits later.
11 Rupp, op. cit. supra note 1 at 31.
12 Id., at 42; Rupp, "A Supreme Court in Germany?," 5 Harvard Law School Bul-
letin 10 (1954).
13 § 67, 69 BVerfGG; BVerfGE 1, 352 (dispute between Bundestag and Federal
Government), BVerfGE 11,1 (dispute between State of Nordrhein-Westfalen and Fed-
eral Government).
14 § 31, para. 1 BVerfGG.
15 § 78, 82 para. 1, 95 para. 3 BVerfGG; BVerfGE 8, 51.
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The idea behind the statutory provisions limiting the court to a
declaratory judgment is that the authority of the court is greatly
enhanced by limiting its function to simply stating what the law is in
the actual controversy and remaining aloof from enforcing the ruling
itself. The only marshal there is to enforce the court's ruling is its
moral authority, the conscience of the parties concerned and, in the
last resort, the people's respect for law and good government. It is
mainly this limitation which renders it less objectionable to let a
court settle legal issues which are closely connected with domestic or
international politics.
To keep itself within the proper bounds of judicial power, the
Federal Constitutional Court has also developed some rules which are
similar to the "Ashwander-rules" as stated by Mr. Justice Brandeis in
his concurring opinion in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority.16
1. "The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legisla-
tion in a friendly, non adversary proceeding... 2" On the assumption
that the proper judicial function is to decide actual controversies and
not to tender legal advice on moot questions, the constitution has given
the court power 17 to decide "on the interpretation of this Basic Law in
the event of disputes concerning the extent of the rights and duties of a
supreme federal organ or of other parties concerned who have been
endowed with independent rights by this Basic Law or by rules of
procedure of a supreme federal organ."' 8 The court has always con-
strued this as meaning that an actual controversy on constitutional
rights and powers must exist among the contenders."0 As an example,
the court dismissed a case brought in 1953 by the caucuses of three par-
ties in the Bundestag representing the government's majority against
the SPD-party caucus after the second reading of the bill concerning
the adoption of the European Defense Community Treaty, attempting
to get a ruling on the constitutionality of the treaty.20 The majority
contended that the defendant minority had violated the constitution
in denying to the Bundestag and to the majority the right to pass
the bill by a simple majority (the SPD had maintained throughout the
debate that the bill could only be passed after the constitution had
16 297 U.S. 288, 345-348 (1936).
'7 Art. 93 para. 1. no. 1 GG; Rupp, op. cit. supra note 1 at 42.
18 Cases of that type: BVerfGE 1, 351, 372; 2, 347 (SPD party caucus on behalf of
Bundestag against federal government on the question of whether the latter had violated
the right of the Bundestag to give or withold consent to an international treaty ac-
cording to art. 59 GG by not introducing the treaty in the Bundestag).
19 BVerfGE 2, 143, 155, 159; 2, 347, 366.
20 Earlier, in 1952, a similar request submitted by the SPD to the First Senate of
the Court was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. See BVerfGE 1, 396; Rupp, op. cit.
supra note 12.
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been amended by a two-thirds majority in the Bundestag and Bun-
desrat). The court said that although a political controversy un-
doubtedly existed among the parties, there was no dispute concerning
their rights and duties under the constitution. The court reasoned
that merely to vote against a bill could not violate anybody's con-
stitutional rights but on the contrary, was the proper exercise of a
constitutional right which every member of the legislature had. 1
The existence of an actual controversy on constitutional powers
and duties is also required for suits brought by the federal govern-
ment against a state-or vice versa-or by a state against another
state.2 This requirement is stressed by the wording of the relevant
rule of procedure 3 which states that plaintiff has to establish to the
satisfaction of the court that his rights have been violated by a
specific act or omission of the defendant.
The question whether a federal or state statute is constitutional
can arise by way of reference from a civil, criminal or administrative
court, by way of a request from the federal government, a state
government or one third of the Bundestag, or by way of a constitu-
tional complaint filed by a private individual.2" In the first case there
is an actual controversy pending before the court below which refers
the constitutional question to the Constitutional Court. In the second
case the constitution requires that "differences of opinion or doubts
exist on the formal and material compatibility of the statute with the
Constitution."" This excludes moot questions. In the third case,
petitioner must establish that his constitutional rights are impaired
directly by the operation of the statute.26
2. "The Court will not anticipate a question of constitutional
law in advance of the necessity of deciding it." The same rule has been
followed by the Federal Constitutional Court. One of the more recent
examples is furnished by a case decided this year between the State
21 BverfGE 2, 143, 168.
22 Art. 93 para. 1 nos. 3 and 4 GG. Cases of that type: BVerfGE 6, 309 (Federal
Government against State of Niedersachsen, so called Konkordat case. It concerned the
question whether Niedersachsen by enacting a statute on public schools had violated
the Konkordat, a treaty concluded in 1933 between the Reich and the Holy See, and
whether the state thereby impaired the right of the Federation to have the states respect
its international treaty obligations when enacting legislation). Another case is found in
BVerfGE 11, 1: State of Nordrhein-Westfalen against federal government on the ques-
tion whether the latter had violated the former's right to execute federal law as a matter
of its own concern by licensing steam boilers manufactured by firms in Nordhein-West-
falen. See also infra 2 (ii) at note 27.
23 § 64, 69, 71 BVerfGG.
24 Rupp, op. cit. supra note 1 at 32-35.
25 Art. 93 para. 1 no. 2 GG, § 76 BVerfGG.
26 § 91 BVerfGG.
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of Nordrhein-Westfalen and the federal government." It involved
interpretation of a pivotal principle of our federal structure laid down
in articles 30 and 83 GG, which states that the exercise of govern-
mental powers and the discharge of governmental functions is incum-
bent on the states and that they execute federal laws as matters of
their own concern insofar as the constitution does not otherwise pro-
vide or permit. Thus, except in such fields as the foreign service,
defense, federal finance administration, postal service, federal water-
ways, and federal railroads, the mandates of the national government
are enforced solely by the states which alone have a complete apparatus
of law enforcement, both executive and judicial, at their disposal.28 In
the case mentioned, a federal statute required that steam boilers be
examined and licensed for the protection of employees before being
placed in use. Upon application of several manufacturers of boilers in
Nordrhein-Westfalen, the Federal Minister of Labor had granted
general licenses for certain types of boilers. The state government of
Nordrhein-Westfalen maintained that enforcement of the federal
statute was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the state and that only
the State Minister of Labor had the power to grant such a license.
The federal government argued that articles 30 and 83 of the con-
stitution by implication permitted that under certain conditions a
Federal Minister could take the necessary steps to enforce a federal
statute even if it did not cover the foreign service, defense, federal
waterways, etc., in order to guarantee uniform enforcement throughout
the Federation. Since the question whether so called supra-regional
administrative acts (iiberregionale Verwaltungsakte) could be issued by
the federal government had for some time been under discussion
between the Federal Council (Bundesrat) representing the states and
the federal government, everyone had hoped that the court would
now lay down the conditions under which the federal government was
entitled to enforce a statute by a supra-regional administrative act.
However, the court felt that to do this would mean deciding more than
the case at bar was calling for and that the question, if put in such
general terms, was not yet ripe for adjudication. Therefore, it restric-
ted its ruling to the statement that in the case at bar the federal
government had violated the rights of the State of Nordrhein-West-
falen because there was no sufficient ground for the federal action.
3. "The Court will not formulate a rule of constitutional law
broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be ap-
plied." Although the case mentioned in the foregoing paragraph could
also serve as an illustration for this rule, it is primarily used in cases
27 BVerfGE 11, 1; supra note 22.
28 Rupp, op. cit. supra note 1 at 30.
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in which the question of the validity of a statute is referred to the
Federal Constitutional Court by a lower court. The court does not
entertain the case on an appeal but must ascertain whether deter-
mination of the case in the court below necessarily depends upon a
ruling on the constitutional issue. 9
4. "The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question
although properly presented by the record, if there is also present
some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of." This rule
is to some extent related to what the court does in the cases mentioned
in the preceding paragraph; if it finds that the statute is not the sole
basis for determination of the case by the court below, it will dismiss
the request. As to other cases coming within the jurisdiction of the
court, the rule does not apply because it is not an appellate court,
but has jurisdiction only over cases involving a clear constitutional
issue.
5. "The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon
complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation."
The Federal Constitutional Court has developed the rule that a
constitutional complaint by an individual against a statute will only
be entertained if the petitioner can establish that he has been directly
injured by the operation of the statute.3 0
6. If somebody has availed himself of the benefits of a statute
he will probably not be able to maintain that at the same time he has
been injured by it. At any rate, this case has not as yet materialized in
the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court.
7. "When the validity of an Act of Congress is drawn in
question ... it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain
whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the
question may be avoided." This is also a cardinal principle in the
jurisdiction exercised by the Constitutional Court. There is always a
presumption that a statute is consonant with the constitution. (Verfas-
sungskonforme Auslegung) .
LIMITATIONS ON THE COURT'S POWER TO "CHOOSE" IT'S CASES
The Federal Constitutional Court unfortunately lacks one ex-
tremely efficient device of self-restraint which the United States Su-
preme Court has at its disposal: it has no certiorari power. The scope of
its jurisdiction has been elaborately laid down by the constitution and
the Gesetz iiber das Bundesverfassungsgericht, and the court must
take all cases coming under one of these headings. When it became ap-
29 For the details of this procedure see Rupp, op. cit. supra note 1 at 33; BVerfGE
2, 181, 190; 2, 237; 3, 187, 195.
30 BVerfGE 1, 97.
31 BVerfGE 2, 266, 282; 4, 7; 4, 157; 7, 267, 273; 7, 305, 319; 8, 28, 34; 9, 197, 200;
9, 284.
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parent that the number of constitutional complaints filed by individual
petitioners was ever increasing and that the court would soon develop
a considerable backlog, it asked the federal government and the
federal legislature to amend the Gesetz iiber das Bundesverfassungs-
gericht to give the court the power of certiorari to accept or reject
constitutional complaints. However, the only relief the legislature
was willing to provide was to establish a committee of three Justices
(out of ten in each Senate)3" with the power to dismiss complaints
provided the committee unanimously agreed that a decision on the
merits would not resolve any question of constitutional law, and that
the petitioner would not suffer a grave loss if no decision on the merits
was handed down. If the three Justices cannot agree to dismiss the
case it must go to the full Senate. This device of "limited certiorari"
has helped to a certain degree to eliminate obviously inadmissible or
unfounded constitutional complaints, but this procedure cannot be
used to evade issues which the court, for some reason, would rather
leave unsettled. Thus the court cannot restrain itself by merely
locking the door.
The judicial settlement of issues involving constitutional law
always has political implications since these decisions affect the
political departments of government or federal-state relations. Never-
theless, as long as a legal rule exists for the guidance of the court it
cannot avoid settling questions by judicial decision even if the legal
question is politically "hot. 3 3 The court, of course, must not interfere
with politics and is not allowed to question the wisdom of a statute
or of an executive act; its function is limited to deciding the legal
questions which are preliminary to the exercise of the political
functions of the other departments of government.3"
There are-quite naturally-questions, the final determination
of which the constitution has entrusted to the political departments
of government. These might justly be called "political" questions.
In the first place there should be mentioned the cases of legislative
discretion. In matters within the concurrent legislative power of the
Federation and the states, the federal legislature has the power to
enact statutes "if a need for federal legislation exists because a matter
cannot be effectively dealt with by state legislation or because the
maintenance of legal or economic unity necessitates it."35
The court has construed this clause as leaving entirely to the
federal legislature the question whether a need for federal legislation
32 § 91(a) BVerfGG.
33 Rupp, op. cit. supra note 1 at 44.
34 See BVerfGE 2, 79, 96.
3r Art. 72 para. 2 nos. 1 and 3 GG.
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exists;36 the court will only examine a claim of arbitrary exercise of
discretion by the Legislature.
A similar problem arose with regard to article 135 GG, settling
the succession of the property of those German states which had
ceased to exist after the war, such as Prussia. Article 135, paragraphs
1 to 3 laid down certain rules to be followed, and paragraph 4 provided
that a different settlement could be effected by federal statute "if an
overriding interest of the Federation so requires." When the court
had to pass on the constitutionality of a federal statute which estab-
lished a foundation to take care of the art treasures of the former
State of Prussia it expressly refrained from going into the question
of whether an overriding interest of the Federation made the enact-
ment necessary.3 7
Another example of legislative discretion can be found in con-
stitutional clauses which give some directives for the settlement of a
certain matter, but leave the details to the legislature. Article 120
GG, states that the Federation shall bear the expenditure for occupation
costs and the other internal and external charges caused as a con-
sequence of the war "as provided for in detail by a federal statute."
The court held that while this statute could not shift the burden from
the Federation to the states because the constitution clearly prohibited
this, in every other respect the legislature was entirely free to regulate
the details. 8
The most important area of legislative discretion lies within the
scope of article 3, paragraph 1 GG, which establishes the principle
that all persons are equal before the law. The Federal Constitutional
Court has developed the rule that article 3, paragraph 1 GG, was
intended to prevent arbitrary action of the legislature. It prohibits
arbitrary unequal treatment of equals. Within these borders the
legislature may exercise its own discretion and may even differentiate
among equals. Its discretion ends where the unequal treatment of
equals obviously cannot be justified by convincing reasons. The
Federal Constitutional Court can only examine whether the legis-
lature has repudiated these limitations of its discretion; that is,
whether it has acted arbitrarily. 9
The scope of legislative discretion has been narrowed by the
court in regard to equal treatment of voters and political parties in
election laws. This is premised on the right of the citizen to an equal
vote and of a candidate or a party to an equal chance in an election. In
36 BVerfGE 1, 264, 272; 2, 213, 224; 4, 115, 137.
37 BVerfGE 10, 20, 40.
38 BVerfGE 9, 313, 330.
3 BVerfGE 1, 14, 52; 3, 58, 135; 4, 219, 243; 4, 352, 357; 9, 20, 28; 9, 201, 206;
9, 334, 337.
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the light of German constitutional history and with regard to the demo-
cratic and egalitarian foundations of the constitution, these rights call
for a stricter and more literal application of the principle of equality.4"
The Federal Constitutional Court cannot issue a writ of manda-
mus to the legislature4' compelling them to pass a certain statute,
although to declare unconstitutional a law which is already on the
statute books may in some instances produce the effects of a manda-
mus. Take for example our Saarland municipal elections case. Section
25 of the statute has been declared unconstitutional. Because there
must be an election, a statute governing the election was needed;
consequently the State Assembly was forced to pass a new statute
consonant with the ruling of the court.42
Occasions also arise when the legislature violates the constitution
by either inaction or incomplete action. For example, a federal statute
had increased salaries and pensions for civil servants in order to
compensate for the rising cost of living, but had left out one category
regarding retired officials. The court held that article 33, paragraph
5 GG, which required that public service should be governed by the
traditional principles of the permanent civil service, was violated.
This provision, the court said, made it imperative that the legislature
provide equally for all categories of the civil service. But the incomplete
statute was not declared void; the court merely declared that the
legislature had, by this omission, violated the constitutional rights
guaranteed in article 33, paragraph 5 GG to the neglected group to
which petitioners belonged.43
If the Federal Constitutional Court is called upon to decide
whether a statute is constitutional, it examines not only whether the
provisions of the statute in their contents are consonant with the
constitution, but also whether the legislature in passing the statute
has observed the procedure required by the constitution. Thus, the
court must look into the question of whether the Federal Council's
(Bundesrat-the Upper House of the Federal Legislature) consent
has been secured. This is necessary for statutes which touch upon
states' rights.44 Thus Field v. Clark45 and Coleman v. Miller" might
40 BVerfGE 1, 208, 247; 6, 84, 91.
41 BVerfGE 1, 97.
42 But see for a different line of argument Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 553
(1945).
43 BVerfGE 8, 1, 20.
44 Art. 93 para. 1 no. 2 GG: formal and material compatibility ("f6rmliche und
sachliche Vereinbarkeit").
45 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
46 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
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possibly have been decided otherwise had similar facts been presented
to the German Federal Constitutional Court.
The Federal Constitutional Court also examines the rules of
the legislature governing legislative procedure on their compatibility
with the constitution. It has declared void a section of the Bundestag's
rules which stated that bills involving additional financial outlay
exceeding the appropriation in the annual budget will not be debated
unless accompanied by a proposal on how the costs should be met;
the court held that this rule put an undue restraint on the right of
the deputies to introduce bills.4 7
A suit on behalf of the Federation may be brought only by the
federal government, not by a single Federal Minister. Therefore, a
Cabinet resolution is required to institute proceedings. The court has
to ascertain whether such a resolution was actually passed and, in
case of doubt, may ask the government for the minutes of the Cabinet
meeting in question. But it will not go behind the minutes; it will
accept those as sufficient proof that a Cabinet resolution was passed. 8
The question of how far judicial self-restraint should go has also
been raised with regard to so-called treaty laws (Vertragsgesetze).
Article 59, paragraph 2 GG provides that treaties which regulate the
political relations of the Federation or relate to matters of federal
legislation require the consent, in the form of a statute, of the federal
legislative bodies. The statute empowers the Federal President to
ratify the treaty and, together with the publication of the text of the
treaty in the Official Gazette (Bundesgesetzblatt) also transforms the
provisions of the treaty into domestic law. 9 The federal government,
in a case concerning the validity of the statute on the so-called Saar-
Agreement concluded between France and the Federal Republic on
October 23, 1954, had argued that the statute giving the consent of
the legislative bodies to an international treaty actually was an "acte
de gouvernement" (an act of foreign policy in the form of a statute),
and that therefore the determination of its validity-and of the validity
of the treaty provisions as well-was outside the scope of the judicial
function. But the court did not accept this reasoning; it maintained
that it had the power to determine whether the statute and the provisions
of the treaty were consonant with the constitution because a statute
was a statute without regard to whether it settled a purely domestic
matter or whether it transformed the clauses of an international treaty
into domestic law.50
47 BVerfGE 1, 144.
48 BVerfGE 6, 309, 324.
49 BVerfGE 1, 396, 411.
50 BVerfGE 4, 157, 161, 162.
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CONCLUSION
In United States v. Lovett,"' Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated in
his concurring opinion that particularly when Congessional legislation
is under scrutiny, every rational trail must be pursued to prevent
collision between Congress and Court. In his opinion, the most
fundamental principle of constitutional adjudication is not to face
constitutional questions but to avoid them if at all possible. The
Federal Constitutional Court cannot apply this maxim to all cases
coming before it, mainly, as has been explained earlier, for procedural
reasons. But in its general attitude, it exercises self-restraint when-
ever it deems it proper. On the other hand, a constitutional court
must be aware that almost all issues it is called upon to decide have
some political coloring and, in a broader sense, concern "political
questions." One of the purposes the Federal Constitutional Court is
called upon to serve is to insure that the business of government
is conducted with due respect for the law. If it shrinks from this
responsibility because a case is politically "hot", it will pass up many
opportunities to demonstrate to the political departments of govern-
ment, and the people that ours is a government of law.
r15 323 U.S. 303, 319, 320 (1945).
1960]
